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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

TAT£Sf INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

/sr

LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO., A
Corporation dba LITTLE AMERICA,
Defendants-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
THIS IS THE SECOND TIME THIS MATTER HAS COME
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for the balance
due on a contract for the purchase of a bus. The Court held that the
plaintifffs acceptance of a check for an amount less than that due
resulted in an accord and satisfaction and dismissed the plaintiff's
action and denied recovery by the plaintiff. The Court also denied
plaintifffs claim for $845.00 damages to a bus loaned to defendant.
There is no dispute concerning the existence of the contract, the original
contract price of $28,514.37, nor the amount paid by defendant of
$25,107.11. There is no issue involving breach of contract or cancellation
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-2of the contract since both parties sought performance of the contract.
The lower court after the first trial, in an order prepared
by Mr. Bird,attorney for the defendant, dismissed the complaint on
the basis of an accord and satisfaction and stated
". . • and that the complaint of the plaintiff and
the counterclaim of the defendant should be and hereby are
dismissed with prejudice*"
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the Complaint but
the defendant did not appeal the dismissal of the counterclaim. This
Honorable Court issued its unanimous decision reversing the lower
Court. The Supreme Court concluded its well reasoned decision of
May 15, 1975 as follows:
" . . . the finding of an accord and satisfaction
and the judgement based thereon are in error. The judgement
is reversed. Costs to plain tiff /appellant.1? Tates, Inc. vs.
Little America 535 P 2nd 1228.
What happened from that time on is appalling and the
illogical results are the reason we are back taking up the time of this
Court©
The defendant contended its counterclaim should be reconsidered
but after argument on the matter, Judge Hall's memorandum decision of
August 21, 1975 stated as follows:
"The Judgement should be and the same is hereby granted
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,407.26.
4. That defendants counterclaim should not again be
considered since no appeal was taken to the Court1s prior
dismissal of the same."
This memo-decision was in error because it did not provide for
interest and attorneys fee.
On September 4, 1975 Judgement was entered in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant in the amount of $3,407.26 with no interest or
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-3attorney's fees and costs and the Court ruled it had no jurisdiction
to hear the counterclaim the same having been dismissed with prejudice
with no appeal therefrom•
On September 12, 1975 the defendant filed a motion for a
new trial which motion was argued and the prior evidence stipulated in*
The Court, by its Judgement December 30, 1975, handled the counterclaim
as a set off allowing plaintiff a recovery of $3,407*26 and the defendant
a set off in the amount of $2,992*50. In order to arrive at this
judgement the Court committed six (6) errors which are as followss
1* The court erroneously reinstated a counterclaim dismissed
with prejudice through the back door by treating the counterclaim as a
set off*
2*

The court erroneously found that the plaintiff promised

delivery of the bus by the end of November 1972*
3* Apparently the court then erroneously found this so-called
promise was in fact, a new contract*
4. The court erroneously found defendants were entitled to
compensation for renting a bus between November 30, 1972 and January 16, 1973
and then erroneously found that $2,992.50 was a reasonable rental charge
for a bus for 1% months use*
5*

The lower court further errored in not allowing the plaintiff

the $845*00 damages to repair its loaner bus and in not allowing plaintiff
attorney1s fees and interest at the rate of 18% per annum*
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to reverse the most recent decision of the
lower court and prays for a judgment in its favor for the sum of $3,407*26
plus interest at th$ rate of*18% per annum from delivery date of the bus
January Digitized
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-4attomeyfs fees and the sum of $845 • 00 for damages to its loaner bus
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 1, 1972 to date*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts concerning the full transaction are set forth in
the plaintiff1s previous printed brief pages 2-6* We pray the court
review those pages and the arguments set forth in that brief which we
make a part hereof by reference*
~*/ ~

Since this Court has already ruled in favor of Judgement for

the Plaintiff, we address ourselves only to the facts surrounding the
counterclaim*
The first step in production of the bus was building the
chasis at the Madsen plant*

The Madsen plant encountered delays* During

this delay period, the representatives of plaintiff and defendant had
constant contact*

Mr* Knight of defendant company urged delivery and

Mr* Knaus of plaintiff company regularly contacted the Madsen company
trying to get delivery of the bus (R* 52,61)*

The defendant did not

cancel the contract, but on the contrary continued to affirm the
contract and sought delivery as soon as possible.
When Madsen finished its part of the contract, it billed plaintiff
for its costs and plaintiff billed defendant for part payment* After
some delay and discussions, defendant paid $10,000*00 in a check made out to
plaintiff and Madsen dated November 11, 1972 (Ex* 5D)* At the time the
check was given to plaintiff, Mr* Knaus and Mr* Knight discussed the
completion of the bus and in defendants witness, Mr* Knightfs own words,
"felt confident that we would have the bus by the end of November*" (R* 99)
In order to assist the defendant as a courtesy (R* 60) but
without being obligated the plaintiff bought a used, exceptionally clean
bus in Boise,
brought
itLibrary,
to Salt
Lake
forSchool,
defendants
use in July,
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-51972. The bus cost $1,816*00 (R. 57-59)#

The bus was in good running

condition when delivered but was burned up by defendant who had to
have it repaired and claims the cost of the repairs against the plaintiff
in the amount of $239.76 (Ex. 4D).

Bus was returned to plaintiff

near December, 1972 with motor completely burned out, costing plaintiff
$845#00 which plaintiff claims should be paid by defendant.
After November the defendant rented a bus and claims the
plaintiff should pay the cost of renting the bus which the lower court
found amounted to $2,992.50•
The new bus was delivered to defendant January 16, 1973 and
a delivery receipt and bill was signed by defendants representative,
Dave Timlinson, stating the total price of $28,514.37 and calling for
payment of 18% interest, collection costs and attorneyfs fees if
required for collection (Ex. 3P). Mr. Timlinson drove the bus away
and that delivery receipt and Tates official billing were sent to
defendant on or soon after January 16, 1973. The billing called for
payment of a balance of $18,514.37 (Ex. 8D).
The defendants sent a check for $15,107.11 dated February 17,
1973 and received February 21, 1973 holding out $3,407.26. This court
considered the matter once and, in effect, said defendants couldnft
hold out $3,407.26 giving Judgement to the plaintiff for that amount
which makes us wonder why we are back before the Supreme Court again
asking for the same thing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REINSTATED A COUNTERCLAIM PREVIOUSLY

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE THROUGH THE BACKDOOR BY TREATING IT AS A SETOFF. THERE CAN BE NO SET OFF IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT FOR $2,992.50
SINCE THERE WERE NO PLEADINGS IN THE ORIGINAL ANSWER OR THEREAFTER
REQUESTING A SET OFF AND THE COUNTERCLAIM WHERE THE SUM WAS ALLEGED
AS A CLAIM BY THE DEFENDANT WAS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Supreme Court held:
"Accordingly, the finding of an accord and satisfaction
and the judgment based thereon are in error."
And then ruled "The Judgment is reversed. Costs to Plaintiff
(appellant)."

The "judgment is reversed" means the plaintiff should have

judgment for the amount of its claim which is the balance due on the
account and which amount is undisputed being well supported by the
evidence and acknowledged by witnesses of both parties as $3,407.26 as of
January 16, 1973. The Supreme Court discussed the claim of defendant for
$3,407.26 in detail and apparently considered it without merit. Tates vs.
Little America P. 1231.
Contrary to defendants claim, the trial court did dispose of
the counterclaim.

The defendant put on its evidence and at the close of

the hearing the court stated:
"The plaintifffs complaint is dismissed, no cause of
action and having so disposed of it your counterclaim should
also be dismissed, no cause of action."
Mr. Bird made up the findings and judgment which judgment stated
in part:
" . . . and that the complaint of the plaintiff and the
counterclaim of the defendant should be and hereby are dismissed
with prejudice."
The defendant has had its day in court, presented evidence and
had its counterclaim dismissed with prejudice. There was no appeal taken
from that order of the trial court so the matter of the counterclaim has
been laid to rest.
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-7Rule 4 K b ) states in part:
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits*"
Blackfs Law Dictionary defines dismissal and dismissal with
prejudice as follows:
DISMISSAL, An order or judgment finally disposing of an
an action, suit, motion, etc., by sending it out of court,
though without a trial of the issues involved, Brackenridge v.
State, 27 Tex. App* 513, 11 S.W. 630, 4 L.R.A. 360. The term
is often used to indicate an adjudication on the merits, Knox v.
Crump, 15 Ga, App, 697, 84 S.E. 169, 173; Butler v. McSweeney,
222 Mass. 5, 109 N.E. 653,655.
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, An adjudication on the merits
and final disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain
an action on the same claim or cause. Pulley v, Chicago, R.I,
& P. Ry, Co,, 122 Kan. 269, 251 P. 1100, 1101. It is res
judicata as to every matter litigated, Roden v. Roden, 29 Ariz.
549, 243 P, 413, 415. A judgment of dismissal and a judgment of
nonsuit have the same legal effect, Suess v, Motz, 220 Mo. App,
32,285 S«W. 775, 776,
In the 1972 Utah case Steiner v. State, 27 U. (2d) 284, 495 P.
2d 809 this Court held:
"An order to dismiss with prejudice and on the merits is
final adjudication of the issues and the time for appeal under
Rule 73 begins to run upon entry of the order."
There is a substantial difference between a set-off (or recoupment) and a counterclaim,
"United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co, (SD NY
1955) 17 FRD 258, 262, 21 FR Serv. 12f. 26, Case 1 *There is a
marked distinction between recoupment and a counterclaim which
the plaintiff has apparently failed to note. Recoupment does not
seek an affirmative judgement. It is defensive.1"•
Likewise a counterclaim cannot be automatically converted into a
set off or recoupment.
Some authorities seem to indicate that there is some interchange
of meaning between counterclaim and a defense, 20 Am Jur 2nd 228 discussing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8set off can be considered a counterclaim or that a counterclaim can be
considered a set off the defendant is out of court because once the
counterclaim fails or is dismissed with prejudice then the set off is gone
too. In other words, while the claim is still alive the court has some
leeway in treating it as either a defense or a counterclaim but once the
claim is finally dismissed it cannot be resurrected under a new name and
come back to life. You can't get life out of a dead tree by merely
transplanting*

The lower court may claim some divine powers but its effort

to resurrect a dead claim can only be black magic to which deceptive powers
we are sure this court will not succumb.
Many authorities talk about set off and counterclaims having
alternative effect - 81 ALR 781, 46 ALR 393, 53 ALR 708*
Rule 8(c) names all affirmative defenses but does not name a
set off as a defense but says defenses can be treated as a counterclaim and
visa versa•
The Court, in our case, as well as plaintiff and defendant considered set off as the counterclaim*

Rule 13 says defendant must state all

claims in its counterclaim and Rule 12(b) says about the same thing. Logan
City vs. Utah Power, 86 Ut. 340, 10 P. 2nd 1097 states if a party fails
to state a claim resulting judgment is conclusive against it as to all matter
of defense.
Mr. Bird made up the original Judgment and without reserving any
rights incorporated in the judgment a dismissal with prejudice of the counterclaim and with it any so called set off. There was no appeal on that
ruling and the judgment for plaintiff became final as a matter of law. There
could not be an off set later on.
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-9POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF PROMISED
DELIVERY OF THE BUS BY THE END OF NOVEMBER, 1972.
The record repeatedly shows the plaintiff never promised but
merely had hopes delivery could be made by the end of November, 1972. On
cross examination Mr. Knaus stated:
"Q. What did you tell? (To Mr. Knight)
A. Well, to the best as to what the factory was telling
me we could deliver in a certain length of time and Ifm not
sure that I know the date that you're referring to because there
were several times in there." (R. 62)
Does this sound like a promise?
date?

Does this establish a delivery

All the way through when addressing this subject Mr. Knaus would

relate to Mr. Knight what the factory said. Mr. Knaus again (R. 53) stated:
ff

A. Yes, I referred to the delivery of this unit to the
best of our knowledge as whatever - - I would have to go back
and check now what we stated we could do from the factory
telling us what they could do."
Does this sound like a promise?
Mr. Knight (defendants witness) testified that Mr. Knaus:
"Said that he had spoken to the people at Ward and he
had talked with someone who was in authority at Ward and that
he felt good about the answer he had received; and for the first
time he felt confident that we could have the bus by the end of
November." (R. 99)
And on cross examination when asked if Mr. Knaus had thought
the bus would be available, Mr. Knight testified:
"More strongly than that - he said he was confident the
bus - - he was confident and sure that it would be available at
the end of November.f' (R. 124)
Do any of these bits of testimony amount to a promise?

The

answer is obviously, No!
POINT III
APPARENTLY THE COURT THEN ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THIS SO-CALLED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10PROMISE WAS A NEW CONTRACT WHEN, IN PACT, THERE WAS NO NEW CONTRACT*
THE COURT ERRORED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S COST IN RENTING A BUS BE
ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF*
There is absolutely nothing in the agreement between the
parties that would permit defendant to claim damages against the plaintiff
for a delay in delivery*

Some contracts are written that way but this con-

tract did not provide for relief if delivery was not made as required*
As stated before no new contract was entered into* Mr* Knight arbi trarily
set December 1, 1972 as some sort of cut off date and unilaterally agreed
with himself that this was a good time to start assessing charges*
Apparently he based this on the fact that Mr* Knaus thought, after
checking with the factory, that the bus would be ready for delivery the
last of November*

Mr* Knaus made no promises, no guarantees and no

agreements; he merely told Mr* Knight that he "felt confident11 it could
be delivered near the last of November* There was no agreements, oral
or otherwise, or any other basis upon which defendant could base a claim*
The law of contracts is so clear it hardly needs argument or
citation of authority*

All of the following sections are from the

Restatement of Contracts* Restatement of Contracts Sec* 19 states in part:
"The requirements of the law for the formation of an
informal contract are:
(b) A manifestation of assent by the parties who form
the contract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor to
the consideration for his promise * * *
(c) A sufficient consideration * * • "
Section 20 - f,A manifestation of mutual assent by the
parties to an informal contract is essential to its formation • ••"
Section 22 - "The manifestation of mutual assent almost
invariably takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party
accepted by the other party or parties"*
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-11The original written offer and acceptance is the only
contract and is the best evidence. The defendant was already committed
to pay a full $28,514.37 - it was already committed to pay the $10,000
and much more. Certainly a new contract cannot be found when a party
promises to pay something which he is already committed to pay - this
could not be good consideration.
Section 75 comment (a) under consideration states:
"No duty is generally imposed on one who makes an
informal promise unless the promise is supported by
sufficient consideration."
Section 76 - "any consideration ... is sufficient ...
except the following:
(a) an act or forbearance required by a legal duty that
is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable
dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or the
public ..."
Obviously there was no new contract requiring plaintiff to
deliver a bus before December 1, 1972.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO
COMPENSATION FOR RENTING A BUS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 30, 1972 AND JANUARY 16,
1973 AND THEN ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT $2,992.50 WAS A REASONABLE RENTAL
CHARGE FOR A BUS FOR 1% MONTHS USE.
How unfair could the Court be?
Because of the defendants concern about its need during the
summer for another bus the plaintiff located a bus in Boise, Idaho, bought
it for $1,816.00, drove it to Salt Lake City and turned it over to
defendant for its use without charge in July, 1972 (R. 57-59, 120)
There was no obligation by contract to provide the bus; it was
turned over to Little America strictly as a courtesy without charge. (R. 60,
98)
The defendant returned the bus in about December, 1972 in such
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12plaintiff of $845•00* (R. 80) The defendant never so much as questioned
this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court completely ignored the
claim as originally set forth in plaintiff's Reply.
The bus traveled 250 miles a day. (R. 112, 113) It traveled
during the heaviest traffic time during the busiest

and hottest time of

the year. (R. 119) Driving a bus fully loaded in the heat of the summer
250 miles a day is extremely heavy use and very hard on any type of
equipment. The defendant surely knew they must at least repair the
vehicle if they received the equipment, tires, etc. free of charge. They
would have to repair their own equipment as part of their operating
expense surely the court cannot hold the plaintiff to repair the equipment
when it had been turned over to defendant for use as its own without
charge. The defendant literally burned up the motor and then demanded
the plaintiff pay for sum $239.76 for motor repairs near the end of
November, 1972. The cost of these repairs were assessed against the
plaintiff by the lower Court in the first Judgement but rejected the
claim in its second Judgement.
Now after using the plaintiff1s bus free for five months and
burning it up the defendant charged the plaintiff for renting a bus for
December 1, 1972 through January 16, 1973 and then claimed the rental
charge was $2,000.00 per month. What a ridiculous charge - if the
plaintiff decided to charge the defendant $2,000.00 a month for using
the bus the defendant would owe plaintiff $10f000.00. This would mean
a years rental on a bus would cost $20,000 which is almost the purchase
price of a new bus. If we took Mr. Knight1s higher figure of $75 per
day on a 7 day week operation the defendant would have paid out $27,375
a year.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13The court allowed testimony on costs of operating a bus and
testimony on the reasonableness of such cost from Mr. Knight who was
shown by the Voir Dire questions of plaintiff's attorney to not be
qualified as a sufficient expert to do so. (R. 107) The witnesses basis
for computing costs was completely erroneous.
Mr. Knight is a business man, an office man (R. 108) with
offices principally in Salt Lake City. Little America has a manager in
Wyoming who takes charge of the buses, dispatches them and sees

that

buses are available, fueled and repaired. This Wyoming Manager also
arranged for the rental of buses. (R. 107) Mr. Knight's testimony
concerning costs was allowed over the objections of the plaintiff. (R. 108)
The witness was clearly mixed up in referring to costs of operating and
costs of renting a bus. The court cannot from the evidence here determine
how charges should be assessed even if they were justified.

(R. 112, 114)

There is no competent evidence in the record. Mr. Knight stated the
22 to 25 cents per mile he was charging the plaintiff included fuel and
oil (R. 114). It should be obvious to the court that fuel and oil would
have to be paid by the defendant if it was using its own bus. The cost
of fuel should not have been assessed against plaintiff. This shows
defendants1 figures are all off because Mr. Knight arrived at his $62.50
per day figure by multiplying 25<t per mile times 250 miles per day. Though
the testimony was $62.50 per day somehow the Court comes out with a
set off of $2,992.50 for 1% months.
The Court obviously was taken in and errored grieviously. The
true test for a bus rental cost as any high school student would know is
the actual rental cost to lease a bus by the month. Though the figure was
never put in the record it would be somewhere between $200-$500 per month
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-14and the leasee puts on his own driver and pays fuel and repair costs.
AS THE RECORD STANDS THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A
FINDING OF RENTAL COSTS.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF
THE $845.00 DAMAGES TO REPAIR ITS LOANER BUS AND IN NOT ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEE AND INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 18% PER ANNUM.
The defendant returned the bus in about December, 1972 in
such poor condition that it had to have a complete motor overhaul at
a cost to plaintiff of $845.00 (R. 80) The defendant never so much as
questioned this cost at the trial and yet the lower Court completely
ignored the claim as originally set forth in plaintiff1s Reply. This
fact and the fact the Court struck out of the plaintiff's proposed
order all interest - not even simple interest of 6% shows the Court
acted on some kind of passion and prejudice. The further fact the
lower court refused to allow attorney1s fee is further evidence that
the court may not take kindly to being overruled. We base our claim
for attorney1s fee and 18% interest from the date the bus was delivered,
January 16, 1973, on the following statement on the delivery receipt
Exhibit 3P signed by the authorized agent of defendant.
Terms are Cash on Delivery. Estimates are for Labor only.
Materials and Parts extra. We will not be responsible for
any loss by fire or theft beyond our control. Vehicles being
road tested are done so at owner1s risk. Interest will be
charged on all past due accounts computed at the periodic rate
of 1*$% per month, which is a per annum rate of 18%. Purchaser
also agrees to pay collection costs, including court cost and
reasonable attorney fees if collection is required.
Received By: /s/ Dave Timlinson
The defendants accepted delivery of the bus on January 16, 1973,
(R. 64) by sending a duly authorized representative as conceded by counsel
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-15for defendant, Mr. Bird, who stated: "Admit he got into the bus and
drove away also admit he was our employee for that purpose." (R. 78)
Mr. Urie was present when bus was delivered. Mr. Timlinson,
who picked up the bus, stated he was an employee. He signed the original
of the Exhibit 3 combination invoice, billing and delivery receipt as
an agent and "Took delivery of the bus and left our premises". (R 77, 78)
There was no objection to the billing for $28,514.37 at the time of
delivery. Exhibit 8d shows the billing as of January 16, 1973 as
$18,514.37 reduced to $3,407.26 as of February 21st. Actually 18%
interest on $18,514.37 for the period January 16th to February 21st would
be about $280 with 18% on $3,407.26 from February 21, 1973 compounded
annually until finally paid. The defendant was billed monthly thereafter
similar to the bill Exhibit 8d and each bill carried the following notes
INTEREST will be CHARGED on all past due accounts computed at the PERIODIC RATE of 1^% PER MONTH, which is a
PER ANNUM RATE of 18%. Purchaser also agrees to pay collection
costs, including court cost and reasonable attorney fees if
collection is required.
Surely these documents put the defendant on notice as to what
interest rates would have to be paid if he didn't pay his bill and that
costs and attorneys fee would have to be paid if collection was required.
When this Court did not mention interest and attorney's fees in its last
reversal the defendant argued that it meant we were not entitled to such
an award.
We respectfully request the Court specifically order that the
plaintiff is entitled to 18% interest on $18,514. from January 16, 1973 until
February 21, 1973 and thereafter 18% interest on $3,407. compounded
annually until paid together with costs and reasonable attorney's fee which
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-16would now be at least $2,500 and further that the defendant pay to
Plaintiff $845.00 damages at the rate of 6% interest compounded annually
until paid*

If such a specific order is not entered by the Court,

judging from past performance in the lower Court, we will end up in
another appeal to this Court in regards to interest and attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE we pray the Honorable Court again reverse the
lower Court in its finding of a set off and find the defendant owes
plaintiff $3,407*26 plus interest at the rate of 18% as set forth
above in addition to the sum of $845 plus interest and reasonable attorneys
fees of $2,500.00*
DATED this 17th day of March, 1976.
Respectfully ^tlbmitted

h E. Sohm
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Suite 81 Trolley Square
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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